As you probably know, the Trump administration banned US companies from doing business with Huawei several months ago. Recently Huawei had a big smartphone launch, the Mate 30 Pro, the first Huawei phone to launch without Google apps, thanks to the export ban. The lack of Google apps is a serious black mark on the device, as it is now shipping without the Android app ecosystem and without killer Google apps like the Play Store, Gmail, Google Maps, YouTube, Chrome, the Google Assistant, and more.
The Internet, as it is wont to do, has been coming up with workarounds to fix this problem to get Google apps on the Mate 30 Pro. The gray market distribution of Google apps is something the Android modding scene has down to a science, and it's fairly easy to get Google apps on things that don't normally come with Google apps, like Amazon Kindle Fire devices, custom ROMs based on the open source Android code (like LineageOS), and on imported devices meant for the Google-free Chinese market.
Unfortunately, none of these methods works on the Mate 30 Pro. They rely on either an unlocked bootloader, which allows users to flash Google apps to the normally read-only system partition, or they rely on "stub apps" left in the system partition by the device manufacturer specifically for the Google apps, so sideloaded versions can get the system-level permissions they need to work. The Mate 30 doesn't allow for either method.
With all the traditional techniques out the window, the Internet's brand-new method for getting Google apps onto the Mate 30 is through a website called Lzplay.net. You can see news articles promoting this site from just about all the major Android news sites. I Googled "mate 30 pro install play store," and literally every result on the first page recommended Lzplay.net. It's easy to see why Lzplay is ubiquitous: go to the website, install the app, mash "next" a few times, and boom, Google apps are on your Huawei device.
It seemingly installs six system apps in the blink of an eye with almost no user interaction. Even though the Google apps should not be able to get the system-level permissions they need to work, they somehow do, thanks to this app. It's like magic.
Lzplay is fast, it's easy, and as far as getting Google apps onto your Huawei device, it works. It's also the biggest Android modding security nightmare I have ever seen. And no, that's not hyperbole.
Protip: Don't set a random Chinese website as the remote administrator of your smartphone
Lzplay.net plugs into Android's Mobile Device Management (MDM) API, which is meant for enterprise services like Android for Work, or your company's IT department. This is a remote management API that is meant to give your IT department full control over a company-issued device. The goal is to allow your IT department to have, basically, as much control over the device remotely as you have in front of it, allowing them to silently install and uninstall apps, change the lock screen password, remote-wipe the device, and do a million other things.
Watch any of the video guides after the app is download and you'll see the "Activate device administrator?" screen pop up, complete with the huge, scrolling list that spells out all the scary permissions. At this point you should really stop and think if granting these permissions to an unknown entity is a good idea. (It's totally not.)
This set of permissions, which used to be called "Device owner," should only ever be given to an entity you 100-percent trust: Apps like Google's Android for Work, an app from your company's MDM provider for your company-issued phone, or maybe you have an Android-powered kiosk or IoT device that you personally want to manage remotely. Those options are fine. What's not fine is granting these permissions to a random website like Lzplay.net.
Nobody knows who or what owns Lzplay.net, and therefore nobody knows if the site is trustworthy or what they want out of all this. With no copyright notice or any kind of ownership claim on the website, there's not much digging that can be done. A whois lookup shows the site is hosted in mainland China and was created just three months ago, and neither of those facts inspires much confidence.
A lot of the write-ups and videos out there gloss over how Lzplay works and just how many permissions it has access to. You visit the website, install the Lzplay app, and then grant it the ultra-powerful device administrator permissions, at which point it does its thing and installs the Google apps. At this point most of the guides go on to talk about how you are pretty much done and how you might have to reset your device afterward. Almost none of them mentions how you still have this Lzplay.net app set as your device's administrator, and how, unless you uninstall it, you have this random third party with a backdoor to your phone, forever. Uninstalling the device administrator app is not as easy as uninstalling a normal app, either—you can't remove the app unless you first dig through the settings and remove it as the administrator first.
The Android modding scene has always had some issues with security. Modding often involves encouraging people to install apps with powerful root permissions that could do very nasty, malicious things to a phone if they wanted. The way the community usually works around this is by either installing apps that are open source, where anyone can audit the code and see what it is doing, or by using a handful of trusted root app developers that have been around for years and years and have proven themselves to the community. In the case of installing Google apps, the normal Google app distributors like Open Gapps have you flash a one-time package to your system partition and you're done. The scripts to do this are open source, and you can verify the proprietary Google applications it installs haven't been tampered with, thanks to Android's APK signing.
The Lzplay.net method doesn't get any of these community safety nets. As I mentioned before, the site is three months old, hosted in China, and no one knows who owns it. What is really egregious, though, is this whole remote backdoor situation, assuming you leave Lzplay on your phone, like most of the guides suggest. Lzplay might not do anything malicious today, but since it still has device administrator privileges, tomorrow it could easily fill your phone with bitcoin miners, remotely install ransomware, or brick your phone. I don't recommend using this method at all, and leaving this grossly powerful app around on your phone, forever, is a huge security problem.
The highly suspicious methods and origins of Lzplay
Part of the rapid rise of Lzplay over the last week or two is because it just works so darn well for getting Google apps onto the Huawei Mate 30. There really are no alternative methods. Google apps are designed to have access to system-only permissions that allow them to provide services to other apps. One example is a unified Google Account APK that handles login duties for all the other apps, and you can't do that as a normal userspace app. Since the Google apps always ship as part of the phone on the system partition, depending on these extra permissions is fine. You can't sideload them like a normal app, though, and since the Mate 30 doesn't have an unlocked bootloader that allows users to modify the system partition, there should be no way to put Google apps on the Mate 30. Somehow, though, Lzplay manages to make it work. How?
The answer is pretty suspicious. Lzplay plugs into special permissions that only exist on the Huawei Mate 30—permissions that allow a sideloaded app to be flagged as a "system" app and be granted permissions that are not normally available to them. In other words, Huawei added its own backdoor that breaks the Android permission system, and Lzplay makes use of it. This all happened shockingly quickly: Lzplay.net launched and articles hit the Internet before the Mate 30 was even for sale. The Mate 30 launched in China on September 26, but news articles made the rounds on September 23. Hmmm.
John Wu, Android security researcher and the developer of the root-enabling Android app Magisk, recently dug into the Lzplay app and Huawei's (Chinese language!) developer documentation to see exactly what is going behind the scenes. Huawei implemented Android's MDM APIs, but then it added two extra permissions for device administrator apps like Lzplay: "com.huawei.permission.sec.MDM_INSTALL_SYS_APP" presumably "install a system app" and "com.huawei.permission.sec.MDM_INSTALL_UNDETACHABLE_APP" for installing whatever an "undetachable app" is.
Allowing third-party apps to modify the system partition would be particularly horrible, since, with no unlockable bootloader on the Mate 30, there would be no way to return to a like-new state. Huawei's "Install_sys_app" permission is not quite that bad—Wu says the Huawei system partition is still read only, and instead, third-party apps can be flagged as system apps without actually being system apps. They don't go in the system partition, but they still get system-level partitions thanks to Huawei's OS additions.
This is something that would never happen on a phone with Google Play, since one of the requirements of licensing the Google Play apps is adherence to the Android Compatibility Definition Document (CDD). The CDD has fully codified the way the permission system works, and for a chapter-and-verse quotation you want Section 9.1, paragraph 3: "Permissions with a protectionLevel of PROTECTION_FLAG_PRIVILEGED MUST only be granted to apps preinstalled in the privileged path(s) of the system image." In other words, if you're not on the system partition, you can't have system-level permissions. Huawei's "flagging" method for escalating system permissions is specifically prohibited.
With no Google apps, though, the CDD does not apply, and Huawei can make whatever security-breaking changes it wants. If you want a real-world example of just why Google's myriad Android rules are necessary, note that it only took a single non-Google phone release for an OEM to blow up the Android security model.
As John Wu writes, this API isn't available to just any third-party developer:
According to the all-in-Chinese documentation, 3rd party developers/companies are required to sign legal agreements and send them to Huawei in order to gain access to the SDK. For each project, the developer will have to submit a request, along with justification, a list of the permissions willing to be granted. In addition, the APK binary for each release has to be uploaded to Huawei for further examination, which can then finally be signed with Huaweis special key.
Wu goes on to say, "At this point, it is pretty obvious that Huawei is well aware of this “LZPlay” app, and explicitly allows its existence. The developer of this app has to somehow be aware of these undocumented APIs, sign the legal agreements, go through several stages of reviews, and eventually have the app signed by Huawei." I would like to add that, remember, this was all finished at least three days before the public launch of the Mate 30. Lzplay somehow knew enough about all of this well in advance of the launch and had time to build an app, go through Huawei's whole process, and launch a website. Once again: Hmmm.
Huawei has already been asked if it is behind Lzplay, and honestly, at this point, that would probably be the best-case scenario, given how powerful Lzplay is. Hauwei shot down this idea, though, and gave the following statement to Android Central: "Huawei's latest Mate 30 series is not pre-installed with GMS, and Huawei has had no involvement with www.lzplay.net."
Further research is not really possible right now, since, as Wu writes, the Lzplay app is "obfuscated/encrypted by QiHoo Jiagu (奇虎加固), and is non trivial to reverse engineer." So somebody went out of their way to hide exactly what Lzplay is doing, so we have no idea how it works or who made it.